MISSING IN ACTION? UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP
IN THE

LAW OF vVAR

DA VfD GUVIEI(

of the rnost strikrng developments m international Jaw
over the last thirty years has been An1erica's effective abdication of
the J es d ing role il had plc:1 y ed in tht.: tldvancentenl of law of vvar
codification and application during the first 200 years of its history.
While the United States hc1s ratified several fairly non-con troversial
treaties in lhe last three decades, i t has r·efuscd to j oin, and even
worked to undermine the i m pl em entat i o n of, other agreements
lhat enjoyed broad jnternalioncll support.
Furthermore, for
probably the first time in its hislory, the United States sought to
avoid the application of rules to itself that it had previously
faithfully observed even in conflicts with adversaries who did not
One

reciprocate.

To understand how exceptional American behavior has been in

this recent period., one needs to a p prec i a te its leading role in this
in earlier days. Dating back to the Arnerican Revolution, the
United States was an early proponent oi conducting hostilities in
faithful adherence to the rule of law and civilized values, including
early recognition of the right to surrender and commitment to
humane treatment of captured enemies.
Both Congress and
George Washjngton agreed on the wisdom of this approach, which
both encouraged enemy surrender, and earned public support for
the American war effort, even while Americans were ty p ically
treated quite harshly by their British a d v ersa ry .
Following its victory in the Revolution, the United States took a
leading role in advancing (urther de v elo p men t of the law,
including protections for prisoners of war in several bilateral
treaties that clearly exceeded the customary requirements of the
lavvs of war as understood in thc:lt e�ge. The United States also
rejected the pre�ctice of other n?ttions wl-w subjected spjes to
su nunary execution; in 1776 Congress made them stcllutorily liable
field
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to trial by court-martic1l using language the�t is still recogruzable in
the modern Uniform Code of Milit,uy Justice.
The United Stales made even more substantial contributions to
the l<1w of war during its

1846-48 conflict with Mexico. Adopting

policies tn rgeted at gaining popult�r Me xican .Kquiescence to the
presence of his r�rn1y in their country)
insisted his

men

Gene ra i

\'\Iinfie l d Scott

respect civilian property and the Catholic Church,

pr�y fr�ir v alu e for all provisions received from local sources, and
pro tect

th e

local

popu lace against predations frorn bandits.

Because there was no leg21l basis for extending U.S. criminilllaw to
Mexic<:ut tt�rritury, Scutt prumulgated rules regulating the conduct
of both Americans cm.d Mexica.ns in the form of

<.1

martial law

orcler, whic h he then evenhandedly enforced, t rying violators
before military commissions which he had cre<1ted expressly for
this purpose.

Departing from the European military prC�ctice of

summarily ex ecutin g guerill a s and other u_nprivilt·ged com batants,
and going beyond the congressional mcmdate for spy

tria ls, Scott

also insisted on conducting trials for these individuals as well,
employing a separate tribunal which

he called "councils of war"

(this role was subsumed by the military commission in subsequent
conflicts).1

Via a series of interve ni ng historical steps, the U.S.

conduct in Mexico eventua.lly formed the basis of what h21s become
codified in. international law as the law of belligerent occupation.2
The Arncrican Civil War savv the d rafti ng of the seminal effor t
in the ove1rall development of the modern law of war, through the
Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States
in the Field.

B etter

known as the "Lieber Code" after its p rimary

c?\uthor, Columbia Unive rsity professor Francis Lieber, this vvork
was the first serious c:�ttempt to capture the full scope of the
customary la w of war in a form. suitnble to guide the co nd uct of
soldiers in the field. Il responded to
professionnl

knowledge

on

the

a

need cretltcd by the Jack of

part

of

the

thousands

of

inexperienced v ol unteer officers drc1wn from civilian pursuits and

1 Sec. ..:. •�
Haridimos V. Thravalos, The lvlilitanf; CulllllliS:'>iun i11 lhl! War vn
rcrroriSIIT, st ViLL. L. H.[\'. 737, 74·!-46 (1006) (dt:'SCrilin� "councils of \VC1r'' under
CL'Ih:•ra! Scott).
.•

2

Sec Oi;�vid Glazier, lglllmlf/cc /:;No/ 8/i:;s: Tlu: Law Ctj6cllis..:rcut Occupntin11 nud
IIII'c;•sioll ��r lmq, 58 RlirCt:f{S L. RFV. 121. 146, 139-73 (2005) ("While the

tile U.S.

underlying causes of Napt)le<m's difficultie!:; in Spain will be set:n lobe the subject
of specific provisions in the modern law, specific measures taken by the
Americans in Mexico will be seen to now generally be the actual mle.") (emphasis
;�ddcd).
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of responsibility in the wpidlv expand ed Union
Army. It Wi'IS cl petrticularly significant reflection of the AmeriCcln
cornmitrncnt to the law of wm given lhCil the Union was not
ob l iga ted to follow i n lernettion al rules in deali n g w.ith an internc:ll
rebe ll ion vet chose to do so ne ver t hele ss . The Lieber Code was
subsequently a do pted in large measure by a nun.1ber of Euro pe an
r�rmies, and is directly acknowledged ,1s the ba sis for su bsequen t
lJw of Wclr codifications, i ncl L1 di n g the Hi1gue Re g ul a ti on s
Res pecting lhc Laws and Cu storn s of War on Land which remc1in
vc1lid lc1w tu this dav. Tbe Un ited States' controversial 1865
prosec ution oi Henry W irz, commandant of the notorious
Andersonville prisoner of vv a r camp, was perh.CJps the firsl modern
"war crimes trial.
Over the rcmCJ in dcr of the nineteenth century the Un i t e d States
con ti nu e d to refine the law of war. AI t hou gh tile conduct of its
wars vvith Native Ameri cc:m s was marred by a num ber of egregious
inci d ents the Army did come to recognize Indian adversaries as
lawful b ellige rents and C1ccord lhcm immmtity from civilian
pr osecut i on for acts conductecl during hostilities. The Philippine
Insurrection following the SpEmish-American Wm saw further
development of U.S. law of war pri ncip les, in cludi ng efforts to
hold American commanders r e sponsible for unlawful
acts
comm it ted by subordinates under the principle of comriland
responsibility.
Contin uing Cit the fore front of l aw of \-Var adherence, the United
S tat es r21tified almost all of the treaties on this subject that entered
into force in the first half of the twentieth century, and pJayed thE"
leading role in. establ ish i ng the first systematic effort at leg<1.l
a cco unt abil ity for Wi'lr crimes in lhe wake of World War ll.
Am eri c an s vvere instrumental in est a blishing and cond ucting the
to p- le v el lnterni'ltional Mi l itary Tribunals at N ure mberg and Tokyo
wh ile U.S. national tribunals t r ied more than 3,000 ndditional Axis
defendnnts arou nd the wo rl d.
The Urti ted States was an active partic ipCJ nt in the diplo m atic
conference thCit negotioted the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which it
re:1 t if ied after the conclusion of the Korean War. Despite popular
portrayals tu the contrary by anti-war a ctiv i sts ; <md u few well
publ ic ize d incidents like the My Lai mass ac r�1 the U n ited States
generally strove to comply with l aw of war mandates in Vietnam
CMefully restricting aerial tmgeting of the North1 for exa m ple U.S.
for ces even accor de d i ndi genous Viet Con g fighters prisoner-ofplaced in posit i ons

,

J

"

,

,

.
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war status although those fighters had no formal entitlen1cnt to it
as internal adversaries of the South Vietnamese government.
As

a

result of concern about the effects of some U.S. actions

during the war, including efforts at cloud-seeding and extensive
use of defoliants, the Senate took the lead

in directing the

governn1ent to negotiate vvhat becan1e the 1976 U.N. Convention
on the Prol>..ibition of Environn1ental Modification Techniques.
1ndeed, the United States participated actively in developing the
law of war through the end of the 1970s. In 1975 it ratified the 1925
Geneva Protocol b;:mning the use of poison gases, and it took an
active role in the negotiations that culminated in the adoption of
two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977,
signing the agreements on the first day it was possible to do so.
Additional

Protocol

l

(" AP

I")

expanded

the

Geneva

Convention coverage of international armed conflict, adding some
rules for the actual conduct of hostilities to the conventions' focus
on protecting persons never or no longer involved in combat and
explicitly codified some important provisions previously found
only in customary rules.

It is undoubtedly one of the most

significant developments in the law of war in the sixty years since
the Geneva Conventions were adopted.

Add itional Protocol II

( AP II") was less substantial, but did expand the scope of
"

protections provided to participants in non-international armed
conflicts, which previousiy had been addressed in only the single
Common Article 3 found in all four of the 1949 treaties.
The 1980s, hovvever, saw the United States change course and
begin to abrogate its historic leadership role.
military and

Although the U.S.

State Department participated in the

protocol negotiations and

initially supported

additional

ratification,

the

Reagan Adn•inistration adopted the critical arguments against API
raised by some conservatives, including Douglas Feith,:> who
would later play a key role in justifying the 2003 invasion of Iraq as
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
submitted

In 1987 President Reagan

AP 11 to the Senate for advice and consent to its

ratification, but his letter of transmittal declared that "Protocol 1 is
3 St:c George H. Aldrich, Prospect� for United Stotes Ratification of 1\dditionn/
PnJtocol i to the 194:9 Ge•lt?Pr1 Co��t�entio11s, 85 AM J lNT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1991) ("The

decision by the Reagan ad ministration to reject Protocol l vvas foreshadO\·ved by

a

series of individual writings from 1984 to 1986 asserting that the Protocol served
the interests of terrorists. . . .

One polemicist Douglas

J.

Feith,

then a Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense, even described the negotiations as a 'sinister and
sad tale' and a' prostitution of the law."').
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fundamentally and irreconcilably flcn·ved" and that it would not be
ratified by the United States:1

Tbl' letter identified two specific

flavvs with the treaty; its treatment of "w<rrs of national liberation"
as interncltional armed conflicts .:�nd its grMlt of con1 ba tant status to
some irregular forces wbich the letter cqut1tcd to "terrorists."� The
letter also says that "the joint Chiefs of Staff have also concluded
that

a

number of the provisions of the Protocol are nulitarily

unaccept<�ble''t• despite the fact the1t the military had no issue at the
tinle of signature. One of these concerns �ovvs separately identified
as being that API is "to(> ambiguous

and co m pli ca ted to use as a

practical guide for milit<lrv opcrc1lions.":'
The President did promise that the United States would work
with its allies to find ways to adopt "the positive provisions of
Protocol I tha,l could be of real hunwnitari<m benefit''� including
their potential application
an

as

initial modest flurry

customary intern21tional law. Despite

of activity in this regard, jnclucling

identification by some administration officials of parts of AP

l that

might constitute customary ldw, ultimately nothing definitive has
ever come of these efforts.

l'he authoritative law of war manual

issued to the U.S. Army today, Field Manual 27--JO,

')

dates from

1956, having been published the year after the United States
ratified the 1949 Conventions.

It thus provides U.S. forces in the

field absolutely no guidance whatsoever as to which provisions of
the Additional Protocols m.ight be considered binding upon the
United States (nor any information on rules contained in the
4
Lett er of Ronald Reagan, President, Uni ted States, to United Stat e s
Co ngress (Jan. 29, 1987), rl!prilltcd i11 81 AM. j. l'\!T'L L. 910. 911 (1987) [hereinafter
L�ller ofTransn1ittal].
5 fd. The concem about irn�bular:;j terrorists \Vel� b.:l::;ed on a flawed reading
of Article 44. That ilrticle spcLifically refers bc�ck to tlw pn•vious article for the
dettnltion of combatant, and Article 43 requires cMnbatants to be L1nder a
comm <1 nd responsible to a state pMty, subject tn an inlern:1l di scipline system
enforcing compliance with the hw: o� war. Cleilrly these critcrin rule our Article
4-± providing protl.!ction for terrorists.

" Jd.
' Aldrich, sTtptll note 3, ,1t 11 (quoting Letter tlf Submitt.1l from Secretary of
State Georg� rJ. Shu l tz, S. TRE,\ I"Y 01)<.. No.2, 100th Cong ress, ·t:,t scss., VII, IX) .
.�

Letter of Trnnsmi tt:ll, Sllpm note -1,

Dr.:r'T Oi·

at •Y: l 1.

A1�.vn, f!Ein M.\'.iUt\1. 27-JO, TrrE LAw uF LAND WARFARE
(1956). The manual also conlilins il single thret?-page change inserted in 1976,
providing guidance on lhe Geneva Gas Protocol ado pt ed the previous year. See
id. ap pendix A-ii ("Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases, and of all analog ous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly
condenmed by the general op inion of the civil ized world .... ).
" LJ.S.

rl-lE

"
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various law of war treaties enacted subsequently, even where the
Meanwhile 168 other nations,

United States is a treaty party).

including virtually all actual U.S. military allies1o except NATO
partner Turkey, have ratified API. The United Kingdom does not
seem� to have found the Protocol to be a significant problem� while
fighting alongside the United States in several recent conflicts. Its
current

military

mam.-taC11

probably

the

most

coherent

and

comprehensive document on the law of war currently available,
has no apparent difficulty explaining AP l's rules. Nleanwhile, the
U.S. Senate has never even consented to the ratification of AP II; it
is

i�nexplicably

still

awaiting

action

twenty-two

years

after

President Eeagan's request for its approvaL
On

a

more positive note, the United States is one of 186.

countries which joined the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention,
con1ntitting itself to destroy all existing stocks. The United States is
also

party

to

the

umbrella

U.N.

Convention

on

Certain

Conventional Weapons ("CCW") adopted in 1980, as well as its
more specific protocols placing restrictions on weapons producing
non-detectable fragments ("Protocol I"), mines and booby-traps
("Protocol II"), incendiary weapons ("Protocol

TH"),

weapons

remnants

("Protocol IV"),

and

explosive

blinding laser
of

war

("Protocol V").
This latter issue has received considerable global attention in
the past two decades, with growing public awareness of the
casualties certain weapons, particularly landmines and cluster
munitions, have inflicted on innocent civilians years after previous
armed conflicts have ended. Popular concen1, mobilized in part by
the

personal

organizations,

efforts

of

especially

individuals

and

the International

non-governmental
Campaign

to

Ban

Landmines, headed by Jodie Williams, led to the adoption of the
1997 Ottawa Convention barring the use of anti-personnel mines
and

requiring

the

destruction

of

all

existing

stocks.

The

Convention now has 156 state parties. But while the United States
no longer exports mines, and has contributed substantially to
landmine clearance around the world, it has refused to join this

IO

lsrael, which is often incorrectly cited as a U.S. e1l! y in popular n>edia, he1s
e1lso refused to ratify API. Although the United States is clearly Israel's leading
s uppor ter in the world community, the t\ovo na tions ore not party to a JTiutual
defense agree ment and thus are not "allies" in any legal sen se.
11 See gellernlly UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL 0� THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT (2004).
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treaty, asserting that anti-personnel mines arc essential for the
defense of Korea, even though the United States has no minefields
under its control there.u
Similar

concerns

have

arisen

over

the

issue

of

cluster

munitions- bon1bs or artillery shells that dispense a large number
of smaller explosive charges capable of killing or incapacitating
personnel and lightly protected vehicles over a large area. A single
cluster vveapon can typically kill all exposed persormel over an
area the size of several football fields.

The problem with these

weapons is their initial reliability; a single bomb might contain
several hundred

individual submunitions and

in actual

use

between ten and thirty percent typically fail to detonate, leaving
dozens of lethal remnants that can maim or kill years after a
conflict has ended. Civilian casualties are still being inflicted by
remnants of these weapons in Southeast Asia today, more than
three decades after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

The

International Committee of the Red Cross ("fCRC") estimates that
U.S. cluster bombs' remnants have caused over
casualties just in Laos.B

10,000

The submunitions dispensed by some

bombs used by the United States in Afghanistan between

2003

civilian

2001 and

were similar in size and coloration to humanitarian relief

packets dropped in the same timeframe, making their use even
more problematic.
While a plausible argument can be made that cluster munitions
use should be unlawful under longstanding customary law of war

principles barring weapons that are indiscriminate in their effects,
the international response has been focused on bringing them
within explicit treaty coverage.

Originally these efforts were

coordinated under the aegis of the CCW process, but frustrated
with U.S. opposition, 111 concerned nations adopted the approach
taken to ban landmines and met outside this process, agreeing to
an outright ban, kno-vvn as the Oslo Convention on Cluster
��
U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked Questions on the , ew
United States Landmine Policy (Feb. 27, 2004), http:/jwww.globalsecurity.org
jmilit,lry/libraryjnevvsj2004/02jmil-040227-30050pf.htm (last visited Apr. 9,
2009).
13 Sec,
e.g., Andrew Feickert, Cluster Munition:;: Backgrou11d and Issues,
CONGRESS COi\!CRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, june 27, 2008, at l, auailnb/e at
http:/jwww.fas.org/sgp/crsjweapons/RS22907.pdf ("Cluster munitions were
used extensively in Southeast Asia by the United States in the 1960s and 1970s,
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC) estimates that in Laos
alone, 9 to 27 million unexploded submunitions remained after the conflict
resulting in over 10,000 civilian casualties to date.").
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Munitions, in May 2008. The United States is now belatedly trying
to achieve a less restrictive pact through the CCW process, but not
surprisingly, few other nations are still interested in participating
in efforts to regulate a weapon that they have already agreed to
ban.
Prosecuting vvar crimes is another area in which the United
States has largely surrendered its once leading role. Although the

1.949 Geneva Conventions called upon states to exercise universal
jurisdiction over grave breaches, the United States waited until

1996 to enact implementing legislation, the War Crimes Act of
1996, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441.. Falling short of the treaties'
JTtandates, hovvever, the War Crirnes Act limits U.S. jurisdiction to
cases in which either perpetrator or victim is a U.S. national.

A

longstanding U.S. aspiration to have a standing court able to
prosecute vvar criminals from around the world came to fruition
with the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
which has now begun functioning in the Hague.

After President

Bill Clinton signed the treaty just before leaving office, his
successor, President George W. Bush responded to conservative
fears that U.S. personnel could somehow be subject to "political"
prosecutions and deciared that he was "unsigning" the treaty. The
United States is thus not one of the current 108 state parties. This is
particularly unfortunate because the Assembly of States Parties to
the Rome Statute, from which the United States is thus excluded, is
currently in the process of defining conduct that will constitute the
crime of aggression.

Having both taken the lead in prosecuting

this offense after World War II, and now using military force more
often than any other major power, this is an area in which the
United States should be particularly interested in having a hand in
developing governing law.
Despite the plethora of law of war treaties now in force, only
the four Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified.

It

was thus entirely predictable, particularly given the failure of the
United States and a ha11dful of other conflict-prone nations to ratify
AP I, that situations would continue to arise in which custom.ary
international law of war rules might still govern many aspects of
anned con.flicts. The ICRC therefore instituted a rn.ulti-year, rt'\ulti
million dollar project to identify customary rules applicable to both
international and non-international armed conflict.

The resulting

three-volume study was published in 2005. The U.S. government,
represented by State Departn1ent Legal Advisor John Bellinger and
Department of Defense General Counsel William Haynes, drafted
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a cri,tical respon s e pote nti,1l ly c haracterized RS " hair spl i tt ing,"
objec ting in p a rti cul ar to the lCRC's rnethodology i n ascertaining
the state prac t ice necessary to create custcHnary intemationallaw.H
While .freely criticizing t he ICRC's efforts, the U.S. reply made no
effort to i de nl i.fy vvhat specific t aws of war rules constitute
customarY law.

fica ncc g iven U.S. con duct
of the so-called ''war on terror" launched in res p on se to the attacks
Although wi des pread support i ni tially
of September 11, 2001.
existed for U.S. a uthorit y to emplov armed force in res ponse to lhe
This failure takes on p articulctr

s igni.

attC!cks, including express endorsement by NATO and implicit
U.N. Secmity Co u ncil sanction, the Unill'd States held that botl1 the

Tal iban and al Qaeda f ell outside the SCL1pe of Geneva Coll\rention
protections.':;

It was therefore logic?llly necessary to groun d U.S.

conduct 111 custornarv
law of war rules, but the realitv
is that while
-

the United States pa id periodic lip
acted as if in a law-free
Determ.inabons

zone.

of

erv ice to doing so, it es sentially

s

vvho could

be

detained,

con d iti ons

of

con.f inem ent at Gua nta na mo and olher f<'lcili lies in the United

StCites and abroad, permissible in.terrogRtion methods, and even
charges which c oul d be preferred and trial procedure should all
hCive been determined wjth explicit reference to the law of war.

But

the United States s imply decl a red its c2lpturcd adversaries to

be "enemy combatants," a term coi ned in the Pentagon which does

not conform

vv ith

any s pecif ic classification recognized by the law

of war. Essenti ally the United States just made up rul es as it went
along.
Even while insisting it was comm.ilted to " h u mane"
treatment, senior U.S. leaders sanctioned conduct ranging from
sleep depriv a tion and stress positions to walerboa.rding.

What is

particularly perverse .is that the idea for using many of these
tech n iques C<Hne

from

the

U.S.

military's Surviv al ,

Evasions,

1·1 Letter from John B. Bcllingt>r, Ill, L�gal Ad\'isnr, U.S. Dep't of State &
William ]. Haynes, GencrDI Counsel, Dep't of Der.. to Or. Jakob Kellenberger,
President. IM'I Comm. of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 200o), avt1ilt1/lle nt
http: / 1 W\Vw.defensdink.mil/ hume/ pdfI Customary _lntemc1lional
_llumi.lniti<Hi.m_ Law.pdf.
15 Sec Mt•monmdum frl>nl Prc.sidc:nt of the Unill!d Stiltes to Vice President of
the United States, Hurn.411C Trl't1tment uf al Qacda nnd Tnliban DetaincL:S (Feb. 7,
2002), MmilnLP/e at btlp:j I wvv1v.pegc.us/ nrc-hive/ Whitl'_House/ bush_mem.o
_20020207_�d.pdf ("ID]eh.'m1ine that none of the pr ov is ion s of Ge ne va apply to
L1Ur conriict with al Qaeda in Afghanist<m or elsewhere throughoLJt the world
because, among otht>r reasons, al Qacda is not a I ligh Contracting Party to
Geneva.").
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Resistance, an d Esca pe ("SERE") training prov id ed to those se rvice
perso n Jle l cons i dered a t greatest risk of capture, special forces, an d
avia tors.
Yet the stated SERE mission is to prepare th ese
combatants for dealing with the unlawful tret�trnent accor ded by
America's recen t u n principled adversaries. These techniques were
known to be ineffective a t obtaining accu ra te information; the very
reaso n t h ey have been e m ployed by U.S. enemies is t o obtain fo!sc
admissions of wron gdo i n g desired for propagand(l purposes.
Even where U.S. conduct was most dependent on legal
COil1[.1 1 iCince - the trial of Guantanamo detainees by military
commissions- it fell short.
Even vvi th o u t wllnt e�re widelv
co ns i d e red to be si g nifi c a n t procedural defects, most law of war
experts agree that the very ch a rges on which three Guantanamo
detainees have been convicted, i nc l u d in g conspirac y and
p ro vidin g n1Citerial su p port to terro ri s.m., do not even state
le gi ti m a te violations of that corpus jttris.
These depa rtu res from the law of wen- have hud real
consequences, undermining world pu b l ic opinion in the U.S.
conduct of the "war on terror," and m8king fore ign nations
reluctant to cooperate with the United States. They have also
furthered the cause of A merica's adversaries, motivating su pport
and even recruitment for both terrorist groups and the lragi
resistance.
The rea lity is that law of war c om. pliance is much more than a
humanitarian ideal; i t i s al so a practical tool fa cil i ta ti n g the overall
e1chieven1ent of national political objec ti ves, as A me rican po l i tical
military leaders da tin g back to Ge orge Washington have lo ng
recognized. l f the United States is to benefit from complinnce with
the law of wc:rr, i t clearly is advantageous for i t also to take a
leading role in l ega l d e vel opn1.e nt, he l ping to sha pe the J a w to its
oyeral l advantage.
ln h inds igh t, it seems l i ke l y that the roots of Americc1's ex tra
lega l conduct of the "wnr on terror" can be seen in the p rev i ous
three decades' trend towards non-participation in ag ree ments like
AP l a nd the fe1ilure to actively define tTlCaning[ul interpretations of
customary low or provide updated law of war gu i d a n ce to U.S.
g rO Lmd forces. Tt can only be hoped that this tnmd will be reversed
in the future and the United States resumes its role as a leading
force in both the deve l o pme n t and implementation of the le1w of
war.
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